This paper develops a theory in which oligarchic ownership of land or other natural resources may impede entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector and may thereby retard structural change and economic development. We show that, due to oligopsony power of owners in the agricultural labor market, higher ownership concentration depresses entrepreneurial investments by landless, creditconstrained households, whose investment possibilities depend on the income earned in the primary sector. We discuss historical evidence from Latin America, India, Taiwan and South Korea which supports our theory.
Introduction
Economic development is intimately related to structural change from natural resourceintensive production like agriculture or mining to manufacturing and capital-intensive production. This process is typically driven by the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class which in oligarchic societies challenges the traditional elite of natural resource owners economically and politically. The relevant individual characteristic which enables agents to become entrepreneur is whether or not they have the means to finance the cost of setting up a firm. Under credit constraints and in absence of bequests, this depends on the households' own income. An immediate implication is that, because every economy in an early stage of development is dominated by primary goods production, the income earned by landless workers or tenants in the primary sector is a decisive financial determinant of the possibilities to start manufacturing activity. This paper argues that, for this reason, the ownership concentration of land or other natural resources plays an important role for entrepreneurship, structural change, and economic development. According to our analysis, oligopsony power of large landowners in the agricultural labor market depresses the labor income in the primary sector and thus the entrepreneurial investments of landless, credit-constrained households.
Thus, our main focus is on the adverse effects of economic power of the preindustrial elite in early stages of development. We thereby propose a complementary theory to the recently emphasized adverse effects of political power of landowners which enabled them to block institutional reforms conducive to economic development. Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) show that land inequality is negatively related to the point of time in which human capital promoting institutions are adopted, thereby delaying economic development. In Falkinger and Grossmann (2005a) we relate the opposition of the landed elite to mass education to trade; an open trade regime is politically supported by rich landowners under a comparative advantage for primary goods production. These general equilibrium theories advance the hypothesis that the landed elite in Latin America blocked reforms of the public education system towards mass education (e.g. Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005) . In an interesting recent paper, Vollrath (2010) argues that in order to preserve high rents on land, large landowners also delayed financial development and therefore slowed down structural change towards manufacturing. Again, land concentration is an obstacle to political reforms which could be conducive to economic development.
Other contributions focus on the land market. Proto (2007) argues that high land inequality is associated with a high rental price of land, which in turn reduces the possibilities of tenant farmers to invest in education. Gall and Masella (2012) show that powerful elites have an incentive to form a coalition which prevents competitive land assignment to skilled producers. This paper focusses on economic (rather than political economy) channels. 1 In economic approaches to inequality and economic development, capital market imperfections play a key role. For instance, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that inequality may be harmful for economic development if credit constraints prevent workers from investing in human capital. Our analysis abstracts from educational investments. We rather suggest a new link between credit market imperfections, occupational choice, and long-run growth patterns, which focuses on the dismal effects of oligopsony power of landowners on entrepreneurship. 2 Banerjee and Newman (1993) , Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997) propose models in which individuals with one-period lives may open up a firm and leave bequests. They show that initial wealth inequality is typically negatively related to growth due to the disability of poor and credit-constrained individuals to cover fixed costs of setting up profitable projects. Banerjee and Newman (1993) consider a case where high wealth inequality may give rise to a poverty trap.
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More specifically, they argue that a low ratio of wealthy entrepreneurs to workers depresses wages of workers so that their bequests are too low to allow their offsprings to move up to the medium or upper class of the self-employed or entrepreneurs. While they consider a one-sector economy, our focus is on structural change in a two-sector model, in which a low ratio of owners to workers in the primary sector depresses labor income such that the rural labor force is prevented from moving to the manufacturing sector. In our model, employment in the manufacturing sector requires the creation of work places by entrepreneurial investment. Individuals live two periods and all potential entrepreneurs are born without wealth. They thus have to rely on first-period wage income (rather than on inherited wealth) to invest in entrepreneurship. This implies a major role for labor market characteristics. We hypothesize that ownership concentration in the resource-intensive sector determines the means of the landless population to invest in manufacturing businesses.
Possibly closest to our paper, Ghatak, Morelli and Sjöström (2001) also link occupational choice to wage determination in a model with imperfect credit markets.
They propose a principal-agent framework with limited liability constraints to focus on effort choice of workers. Removing credit constraints mitigates entry barriers into entrepreneurship and reduces inequality. Through affecting the agency problem, however, this may reduce incentives to work hard and therefore slow down development.
Whereas their model is driven by the "joint presence of incentive problems in the labor market and imperfections in the credit market" (p. 783; italics original), our model is driven by the joint presence of oligopsony power of landowners and restricted access to credit of landless workers who face the choice whether or not to become entrepreneur.
Moreover, our two-sector framework allows us to explicitly focus on structural change from primary production to manufacturing. We also discuss historical evidence on the relationship between land concentration, wages and the evolution of the manufacturing sector.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 illustrates the basic message of the paper in the static version of the model. Section 3 extends the model to a dynamic workers are self-employed whereas our focus is on entrepreneurship.
overlapping generations model. It characterizes the dynamics of the development of entrepreneurial activity and structural change towards manufacturing production. Section 4 discusses historical evidence. We first outline how oligopsony power in the rural labor market was historically associated with slow structural change in Latin America and India. We also document the increasing orientation of peasants towards nonagricultural enterprises and fast industrial development in Taiwan and South Korea in the aftermath of successful land reforms initiated in the early 1950s − consistent with the link between ownership concentration, income levels of landless households, and structural change suggested by our framework. The last section provides concluding remarks.
Static Version of the Model
We first illustrate the basic mechanisms how oligopsony power of oligarchic landowners in interaction with credit market imperfections may affect the economic structure, by employing a static version of our model. We consider a small open economy. There are two sectors, a primary (−) sector, called "agriculture", and a manufacturing ( −)
sector. Goods markets are perfectly competitive. Consistent with the assumption of a small open economy, goods prices are exogenous. For simplicity, they are assumed to be equal to unity.
Endowments
There are three types of households: First, a "traditional elite", represented by a discrete number of    1 households, who own some natural resource, hereafter referred to as "land". 4 Second, a large number of households, , who are endowed with labor and do not own land. The  landless individuals may work in agricultural or manufacturing production. For simplicity, suppose that each production worker can be employed in only one sector. If employed in the  −sector, he or she inelastically supplies one unit of labor. In contrast, workers employed in agriculture react elastically to the oligopsonistic wage setting of landowners. Denoting by   the number of workers in the  −sector, there are
workers seeking employment in the agricultural sector. Third, there is an entrepreneurial and landless class of size   . Entrepreneurs create work places in the  − sector.
In the dynamic version of the model presented below, the number of entrepreneurs,   , will be endogenous, based on a decision of workers whether or not to become entrepreneur later in life, and there is heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability. Here we assume that   is exogenously given and entrepreneurial abilities are identical.
We normalize total land size to be equal to the population size of workers, . Thus, we abstract from effects of population density and focus on the ownership concentration. We measure this concentration by the ratio of workers to owners,  :=    , which with our normalization equals ownership of land per member of the traditional elite.
It is assumed that the total amount of land is equally distributed among landowners.
Technology and Market Structure
While goods markets are perfectly competitive, labor and financial markets are not.
Agricultural Sector
Each landowner produces output  in the agricultural (−) sector on his landholding
where  is a linearly homogenous function and   is the amount of labor a single landowner employs; (·) is increasing, strictly concave and fulfills the standard boundary conditions.
According to (1), the share of individuals seeking employment in the −sector is
Landowners possess oligopsony power. Facing a certain number of people supplying their labor force according to an increasing labor supply schedule, they exploit this power by setting a wage rate which is lower than the marginal product of agricultural labor. The oligopsony power increases with the number of people seeking employment in the −sector and declines with the number of landowners competing for agricultural workers. As shown in the appendix, income of an agricultural worker can be written
First, the wedge between the wage rate and the marginal product of agricultural labor increases if land ownership is concentrated on fewer owners (higher ). From this, consistent with historical evidence presented in section 4, we obtain
If workers in the −sector were paid their marginal product, we would have
Second, a larger share of workers,   , who seek employment in the agricultural sector, lowers the marginal return to labor. Thus,      0 would also hold if the wage rate in the −sector was equal to its marginal product. However, under oligopsony power, also the labor input per worker in the −sector is reduced, additionally depressing wage income.
As also shown in the appendix, under production function (2), income (profit) of landowners,   , is given by
We shall remark that, for the critical property     0, alternative microfoundations of economic power of owners are conceivable. For instance, although we will refer 5   (   ) would also be increasing in both arguments if agricultural workers were paid their marginal product.
to a decrease in  as lower land concentration, a reduction in  may be interpreted as any land reform which raises income of tenants and reduces profits of owners. For instance, Besley and Burgess (2000) and Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) analyze the impact of various land reform measures in post-independence India, including regulatory improvement of contractual terms of tenants and reduction in power of (absentee) landlords.
Manufacturing Sector
Entrepreneurs have to incur fixed set up costs in advance of production in order to create workplaces. A fixed labor requirement ≥ 0 together with a capital requirement (  ) creates employment capacity   (which is fully used in equilibrium); (·) is increasing and strictly convex, with (0) = 0. Denoting the wage rate in manufacturing by   , total set up costs are   + (  ). After investment these costs are sunk. Total employment of workers in the  −sector created by the   entrepreneurs is given by
Under credit constraints, each entrepreneur can at most incur investment costs which are a fixed multiple of labor income, earned prior to entrepreneurship. With income , he or she can invest ,  ≥ 1. 6  = 1 means that no credit market exists.
Here we assume that  is equal to   , the income of a manufacturing worker. Later, in the dynamic version of the model in which the number of entrepreneurs is endogenous, workers live for two periods and can switch from first-period production work in the −sector or the  −sector to entrepreneurial activity in their second period of life.
The higher is , the better developed is the financial market. Also assume that  .
Otherwise, wage income   would not be sufficient to cover the costs for the fixed 6 See also Bernake and Gertler (1989) . The following simple microfoundation heavily draws on Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) . Let  and  denote the interest rate and income, respectively. Suppose an entrepreneur who invests  can defraud the creditors by paying a cost , 0 ≤   1 + . To do this is not worthwhile if  ≥ (1 + )( − ), which is equivalent to  ≤ ,  ≡ (1 + )(1 +  − ). Thus, the maximum amount of investment is , where  ≥ 1. labor requirement.
After investing in creating employment capacity   , an entrepreneur produces by using a simple constant returns to scale technology with labor as only input. Manufacturing outpt per entrepreneur is given by
where   is labor input and   0 denotes entrepreneurial ability. Note first that entrepreneurs would make losses if   would be equal to the marginal product of labor at the production stage, due to the presence of set up costs and the constant-returns production technology (7). Therefore,    . Second, it is plausible to focus on the case where manufacturing wages are not lower than agricultural wages. In sum, we
In principle, for instance, if workers in the manufacturing sector have bargaining power, we could have
We consider this case in Falkinger and Grossmann (2005b) . 7 Here, however, we focus on the case that   equals the wage income in the agricultural sector,
manufacturing workers lack bargaining power, they will accept any wage which is not below the outside option in the agricultural sector and entrepreneurs pay the lowest one possible. Using (3), we thus have
Equilibrium
An entrepreneur who is not credit-constrained chooses employment capacity   to maximize profit
Assuming an interior solution and using (6), the first-order condition reads (8) and (10), labelled the "−curve" and the "−curve", respectively. The −curve is increasing in   whereas the−curve is decreasing in   . Higher land concentration (increase from
shifts down the −curve by depressing labor income. In absence of credit-constraints, this raises the optimal employment capacity and therefore raises total manufacturing employment,   , in equilibrium; in turn, this lowers agricultural employment. The reason is that lower wage costs in production induce entrepreneurs to raise employment capacity. Thus, without credit constraints, stronger oligopsony power of landowners boosts structural change towards manufacturing.
Now suppose that entrepreneurs, with wage income   , are credit-constrained.
Capacity,   , is thus limited to the amount implied by the condition that the means of finance,   , equal start-up costs. We have by (11), labelled "−curve". The latter starts at(   ) = 0. Also the−curve is increasing in manufacturing employment,   . The reason is that under credit constraints higher income,   , enables entrepreneurs to create more workplaces. Since higher manufacturing employment, in turn, goes hand in hand with higher wage costs in production, there may be multiple equilibria, i.e., multiple intersection points between both curves in Fig. 2 . As the −curve starts above the−curve, an equilibrium exists and is unique, if the−curve is steeper than the −curve. This is the case shown in Fig. 2 . Higher land concentration (increase from  0 to  1   0 ) again shifts down the −curve by depressing wage income. This tightens credit constraints and therefore, in contrast to the case without binding credit constraints, reduces manufacturing employment. The opposite holds if  increases, which shifts the−curve downwards.
For sufficiently high , credit constraint (11) is no longer binding and the equilibrium is determined by the curves shown in Fig. 1 .
In sum, the simple model suggests that higher land concentration promotes structural change under advanced credit markets and retards change if credit-constraints are severe.
Dynamic Model
In the present framework, entrepreneurial activity is a decisive determinant for the size of the manufacturing (relative to the primary) sector. We associate development of an economy with an increase in manufacturing employment (and, consequently, a decrease in agricultural employment) over time,   . 8 For studying economic development we therefore have to determine the emergence of entrepreneurial activity endogenously.
We do this by extending the static model considered in section 2 to an overlapping generations economy with two periods of life, where individuals may differ in entrepreneurial ability.
The dynamics come from the decision of individuals who are workers in their first period of life to switch to entrepreneurship in the second period. This decision depends on the labor market income earned in the first period and on an individual's entrepreneurial ability. Everything else is like in the static model.
We implicitly rule out that landowners adopt an entrepreneurial role in manufacturing. If landowners could choose to give up their estate and become entrepreneur in the manufacturing sector, the question is in which sector their profits are higher.
As will become apparent, in equilibrium, the total derivative of profit per landowner   with respect to ownership concentration  is positive. Thus, landowners will not find it attractive to become entrepreneur if  is sufficiently high. This is supported by historical evidence. Consistent with our analysis, Young (1995) finds that savings 8 According to (4) and (8), an increase in   raises wage income. In Falkinger and Grossmann (2005b) , we also link entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector to productivity. from previous wage employment was the main source of start-up capital for micro-scale enterprises in rural Scotland between 1840 and 1914. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) point out that in early stages of development the rich were typically landowners who did not engage in business outside the primary sector. According to Crouzet (1985) , in the UK about half of the founders of large industrial undertakings during the first industrial wave (1750-1850) came from the working class or lower middle class. Some of them, or their fathers, were employed in the agricultural or mining sector. However, only 3 percent of entrepreneurs were part of the upper class (landowners or officers) and less than 10 percent of entrepreneurs were descendants of a landowner family. For instance, "after 1815, [landowners] did not make any serious contribution either to the cotton industry or to the great expansion of the iron industry which took place in the 1830s" (Crouzet, 1985, p. 77) . 
Time Structure
The number of landowner households and the total size of land are time-invariant.
Thus, also the ownership concentration, , is time-invariant. In each period, a landowner household consists of parent and child, where the child becomes parent in the second period of life and inherits the land estate. The rents from the fixed factor are shared within a household of the traditional elite between parent and child.
In each period, a large number of landless workers, , is born. They are identically endowed with raw labor in the first period of life. Individuals may save in the first period of life for old age. Consistent with the open economy assumption the interest rate is exogenous and set to zero for notational simplicity. Therefore, individual savings decisions have no general equilibrium effects and play no role in our analysis.
Each individual may become entrepreneur in the manufacturing sector in the second period of life. When not becoming entrepreneur, individuals retire in the second period of life. The cumulative distribution function of entrepreneural ability is time-invariant.
It is denoted by () and has support [0],  0. Let    denote the number of entrepreneurs in period , where   0  0 is given. We assume that there is no disutility of work for entrepreneurs. As second-period labor income is zero for those who do not choose to become entrepreneur, individuals enter the market as entrepreneurs if net profits are non-negative. 10 An individual who decides to become entrepreneur uses first-period labor income,  −1 , to finance setting up a firm. The total set up costs of an entrepreneur  in period  − 1 who creates employment capacity    is given by
An individual with first-period income  −1 can maximally incur set up costs  −1 ,  ≥ 1, in order to produce in .
Individual Choices
We compare the cases of non-binding and binding credit constraints by first examining the investment choice of entrepreneurs and then the decision of workers whether or not to become entrepreneur in their second period of life.
An entrepreneur  with ability   and first-period income  −1 chooses optimal employment capacity (i.e., firm size)    to maximize net profits,    . As output (and revenue) of entrepreneur  in  is   =      , the profit maximization problem reads as
Non-Binding Credit Constraints
Suppose first that no entrepreneur is credit-constrained. An unconstrained entrepreneur (i.e., (14) is not binding) chooses employment capacity according to first-order
The resulting profit is given by
More able entrepreneurs want to create larger firms,
12 Moreover, it is easy to see that The fraction of entrepreneurs in period  is
The fraction of production labor employed in the  −sector in  is R
The start-up labor requirement () in  is employed by the fraction of entrepreneurs
Consequently, the total fraction of agricultural 11 For notational simplicity, wage rates are supressed in functions   and   . 12 Thus, the firm size distribution primarily depends on the distribution of entrepreneurial ability (). To match the observed firm size distribution is beyond the scope of the paper. It would require to specify () and allow for the "mixed" case where some entrepreneurs (with high ability) are credit constrained and others are not. Proof. Use (15), (18) is higher, less entrepreneurs are active in period  + 1 (i.e., +1 is higher) because they anticipate higher marginal costs in  + 1. If  0, this lowers manufacturing labor demand in . If    is higher, less capacity will be installed by entrepreneurs who are active in period , according to (15); this raises  . Moreover, if  0, costs of entry in order to be active in  + 1 rise; this raises +1 . Both effects reduce manufacturing employment in  and therefore raise the fraction of agricultural workers in .
Binding Credit Constraints
Now suppose that all entrepreneurs are credit-constrained. If credit-constrained, en-
which results when constraint (14) is binding. In this case, we have
Thus, when credit constraints are binding, higher first-period income and more advanced credit markets (higher ) allow to create larger firms. The resulting profit is
13 Recall that   denotes the total number of workers in the  −sector. 
Recall from (15) that, when credit constraints are non-binding, the optimal capacity is given by
In a similar fashion, we can show
The profit in  of a constrained entrepreneur is increasing in the means of finance,  −1 , because employment capacity is suboptimally low and, according to (19), also increasing in  −1 . This explains Lemma 3.
Macroeconomic Equilibrium
We now derive the macroeconomic equilibrium. In order to avoid cumbersome case distinctions and to emphasize the impact of oligopsony power of landowners for economic development through the interaction between land concentration and credit market imperfections in its sharpest relief, we focus on the polar cases where either no or all entrepreneurs are credit-constrained.
Recall that wage income is the same in both sectors, i.e.,
Thus, wage income is determined by oligopolistic landowners in the −sector which take   (the fraction of workers supplying labor to the agricultural sector) as given.
Non-Binding Credit Constraints
According to Lemma 1, threshold ability level  is a function of    and, if  0, also of   −1 . Recalling this and substituting  and +1 into (18) and using
we can write  Proof. Uniqueness of a steady state holds because the right-and side of
To prove the comparative-static result, recall that  is decreasing in  and apply the implicit function theorem.
The main insight of Proposition 1 is simple. Without credit-constraints, entrepreneurs in the  −sector create more workplaces when marginal wage cost at the production stage (  ) is lower. As   =   , this wage cost is decreasing in land concentration (), because more oligopsony power of landowners in the −sector affects the wage to be paid by entrepreneurs. In absence of credit constraints, this mechanism parallels the static version of the model in section 2, where the number of entrepreneurs was exogenous (Fig. 1) . In the dynamic model, there is an additional effect of an increase in : the increase in profits resulting from a lower   also encourages entrepreneurship. In sum, an increase in  promotes development in absence of credit constraints. Moreover, if  0, there are transitional dynamics. 
Binding Credit Constraints
If credit-constraints are binding, according to (19) and (21), the chosen employment capacity of entrepreneur  is given by
Lemma 4. Credit-constrained entrepreneurs, whose investments depend on their first-period 14 Characterizing the dynamics from the second-order difference which results when  0 would require strong assumptions on functional forms. wage income set by oligopolistic landowners, create less employment capacity for period  if the agricultural labor share in period  − 1 (  −1 ) is higher or if land concentration () is higher. The opposite holds if the credit market is more advanced (higher ).
For profits of entrepreneurs we have:
Given marginal wage costs in period , 
 0 from (4) and observe (22)). However, there is a second, counteracting effect on profits. An increase in  also lowers wage costs per production worker. For entrepreneurs active in , these are given by    . Through this effect, profits    are increasing in . Hence, the total effect of an increase in  on entrepreneurial profits is ambiguous. By contrast, because an increase in  raises employment capacity  In period , the fraction of manufacturing production labor is (1 − (  ))   . The fraction of entrepreneurs active in period  + 1, each with labor requirement in , is given by
Thus, the agricultural labor share in  is given by
Again denote the steady state level of the agricultural labor share by  .
Proposition 2. Suppose that credit constraints are binding. whereas a more concentrated ownership of land (higher ) has an ambiguous effect on
(b) For  0,   follows a second-order difference equation and an increase in  has an ambiguous effect on it.
Proof. We start with (a). For = 0, according to (24) and Lemma 4 and 5, the right-hand side of (25) This is because an increase in  may foster entrepreneurship, unlike in section 2, where this possibility was ruled out. As discussed above, the reason is that when landowners possess stronger oligopsony power, entrepreneurs face lower marginal wage costs in manufacturing production.
15 When  0, also fixed costs of employment creation are 15 If workers in the manufacturing sector have bargaining power and      (   ), then this effect reduced, which may affect the evolution of the economy.
Discussion of Historical Evidence
This section discusses historical evidence for Latin America, India, Taiwan and South Korea, supporting the mechanisms proposed by our theory: that oligopsony power associated with a high concentration of landholdings depresses income of peasants.
In interaction with credit constraints, this possibly impedes employment creation of entrepreneurs and possibly also entrepreneurship outside the agricultural sector.
Latin America
The strong concentration of landholdings in Latin America has been widely documented in the literature (e.g. McBride 1936; Mosk, 1951; Barraclough, 1970; Clark, 1971; Katz, 1974; Morse, 1975; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994) . Apart from its implication on political outcomes, an important economic result of the oligarchic ownership structure was a substantial degree of power of large landowners in the labor market for rural work and over tenants. Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995; p. 2678 ) conclude that "a major purpose of the huge landholdings was to restrict the indigenous population's possibilities for independent cultivation". Peasants were typically allowed to cultivate a small piece of land on the farm of owners of haciendas or landlord estates for own subsistence in exchange for labor services, for which they might not even receive a wage payment. Clearly as a result of oligopsony power of owners, these "share tenants do not receive their full marginal product" (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 1995; p. 2670).
Regional oligopsony power was also secured by restrictions on peasant mobility through vagrancy laws or debt peonage. 16 Vagrancy laws were introduced 1825 in El vanishes and an increase in land concentration  unambigously impedes development (see Falkinger and Grossmann, 2005b , on such alternative specification of wage formation in manufacturing. 16 The poor village and smallholder population accepted to work on the plantations in return to cash advances and had to stay until the debt was paid off. Debt repayment was difficult, however. Employers operated company stores where goods were sold at inflated prices. This contributed to a stagnation of real wages for many decades. After death, the duty to repay debt was passed on to Salavador and 1877 in Mexico. 17 In Guatemala vagrancy laws replaced debt peonage in 1934 (abandoned in response to international pressure), implying that someone with little or no land had to work at least 150 days per year on a coffee plantation. From the perspective of a large landowner, such legal measures kept the elasticity of labor supply low and thereby enhanced oligopsony power. As a result, the real wage rate for agricultural labor was extremely low. For instance, in Guatemala it showed no upward trend in the century prior to the revolution in 1944 (Schweigert, 2004, Tab. 5) . Still in the 1960s, average annual per capita peasant incomes in Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru were just about USD 40-100 (Barraclough, 1970) .
Despite revolts and revolutions, triggered by the dramatic concentration of landholdings in Latin America and the resulting situation of most peasants, land reforms have mostly been unsuccessful. As a notable exception, Mexico implemented an eventually successful land reform, starting in 1917. It was confiscatory for land in excess of 100 hectares. Total compensation to landowners was a mere fraction of 0.5 percent of expropriated land (Flores, 1970) . 18 In line with our prediction that less concentrated land ownership is conducive for investments of initially landless households outside the primary sector, Flores (1970, p. 904) concludes that "there is no doubt that high rates of capital formation for Mexico's industrial revolution in the early stages of the reform, 1917-42, came from agriculture".
Overall, however, the oligarchic ownership of land in Latin America resulted in a slow-growing manufacturing sector. 19 Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, industrial development was in fact negligible. 20 During the first half of the twentieth children. (See Katz, 1974, and Bulmer-Thomas, 1994, ch. 4.) 17 See Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995, Tab. 42 .1, Appendix 1) for a systematic account of legal measures to "surplus extraction" to the favor of large landowners in many parts of the world. 18 In contrast, the envisaged large-scale land reform in Venezuela, which began in 1958, was impeded due to high costs of the government, which aimed to compensate landowners according to the market value of land.
19 Consistent with our assumptions, labor was the main input in current manufacturing production and, in contrast to the agricultural or mining sector, typically decently remunerated (see BulmerThomas, 1994, p. 121) .
20 Unsurprisingly, also urbanization was much slower than in the United States. In Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, for instance, the fraction of the national population living in the largest cities basically stagnated in the entire nineteenth century (e.g., around 10 percent in Mexico). In the U.S. the population share residing in towns of 8000 or more inhabitants gradually rose from 4.9 percent in century the situation eventually improved, although manufacturing development still lagged considerably behind most regions of North America. 21 Manufacturing output as share of GDP in 1913 was 16.6 percent in Argentina and 14.5 percent in Chile (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994, Tab. 5.3) . In Brazil in 1920 it was 12.1 percent, but only 3 percent of the labor force was employed in modern manufacturing. Mexico, with 12.3 percent in 1910 had a comparable manufacturing share, whereas that of Columbia was just 6.7 percent in 1925. For instance, the share of employment in the agricultural sector was basically stable between 1880-1930 in Brazil at circa 2/3, whereas it sharply declined in the United States and Canada from around 50 percent to 22 and 31 percent, respectively. 
India
In India, during the British empire many small peasants lost their land and became wage workers in the agricultural sector (Patnaik, 1983) . Land concentration was particularly high in areas where the British introduced landlord-based revenue systems for collecting land taxes. In these areas, single landlords were free to collect taxes from peasants to fulfil the revenue liability of a village, whereas in other areas revenue settlement was directly made with individual cultivators or village bodies which jointly owned the village (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005) . Similarly to many parts of Latin America, wage negotiations were infrequent and agricultural workers were often tied to landlords by debt peonage. Roy (2005) provides evidence that, as a result, the average real wage for agricultural labor in colonial India showed no upward trend from the 1870s until the end of the British empire. In contrast, real wages in urban areas increased significantly.
1810 to 33 percent in 1900 (Morse, 1975, pp. 5-9) . 21 Differences in land concentration may also explain differences in regional development within the US. Braunhaut (1949) and Wright (1987, Fig. 1 ) provide historical data for US farm labor wage rates for the time periods 1909-1948 and 1866-1942, respectively . Consistent with oligopsony power of large landowners, they find substantial and persistent regional wage differentials between the South − which was characterized by large plantations − and the rest of the country. Braunhaut (1949, p. 189) attributes these wage differences to "the fact that agricultural workers have largely remained unorganized [...] [and] virtually without bargaining power, particularly in the instances where farms are being operated on a commercial basis by absentee owners".
22 See the data provided by Peter Lindert under www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/. Rosenzweig (1978) exploited the regional variation of land inequality in India to examine how labor market outcomes depend on land concentration among owners, employing data from a household survey in 1960-61 from 159 Indian districts. He shows that higher land concentration (measured by the Kuznets ratio of landholding inequality) has a strong negative impact on agricultural wages. In line with our model based on labor market power of large owners, he concludes that this finding "may partly reflect the monopsonistic restrictions on wages and employment by relatively large landowners" (Rosenzweig, 1978, p. 860 ).
More recently, Besley and Burgess (2000) analyze panel data for 16 Indian states, 1958-92, on the impact of land reform measures. They find that particularly those reforms raised agricultural wages and reduced poverty, which improved the conditions of tenancy contracts, reduced power of absentee landowners and abolished intermediaries which collected land revenues increased income of tenants. 23 Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that, nevertheless, the historical institution of a landlord-based revenue system had long-lasting effects (still in the period 1960-85) on education spending, agricultural investments and agricultural productivity which cannot alone be explained by high land concentration. They do not look at agricultural wages and development of the manufacturing sector, however. In any case, institutions could matter over and above economic power of landlords which results from high land concentration. We see both approaches as complementary. Future research may attempt a comparative analysis of various theories on the effects of land concentration and land institutions on the non-agricultural sector, which we lack at the moment.
Taiwan and South Korea
There is still a controversy about the determinants of the remarkable pace of development in Taiwan and South Korea after independence from Japanese colonial rule. 23 The evidence by Besley and Burgess (2000) also suggests that land reforms in India after 1958 had no effect on agricultural output, whereas Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) show that tenancy reform in West Bengal in 1977, which to some degree assigned property rights to tenants, substantially raised agricultural productivity. The earlier literature on the effects of land concentration and land reforms on the performance of the agricultural sector is surveyed by Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995) .
For instance, Rodrik (1995) challenges the widespread belief that the 'East-Asian miracle' can mainly be explained by the governments' trade policy. He rather points to possible effects of the unusually successful land reforms and a negative relationship between rates of economic growth and land inequality (rather than income inequality) in cross-country data.
Our paper may contribute to this debate by proposing an economic mechanism for beneficial effects of land redistribution. In Taiwan, during the Qing's dynasty rule (1683-1895), land concentration was greatly enhanced when individuals or land companies purchased land from the government or from aborigines. Smallholders saw little change in real income during Japanese rule and were largely dependent on wage income, whereas the value of land increased quickly. At the end of World War II, after
Taiwan was transferred to China, the Nationalist government confiscated Japanese property and, with American help, initiated a major land reform in three steps between 1949-53. First, public land was sold to tenants at a fairly low price (equal to 2.5 times annual yield of the main crop). Second, the rent tenants had to pay to landowners was limited to a maximum of 37.5 percent of normal harvest value, down from typically over 50 percent. Third, and maybe most important, landowners had to sell land in excess of 3 hectares to the government, which resold it to tenants. An estimated 37 percent of cultivated land was redistributed under the program and farm incomes rose dramatically, by 230 percent to 1968 (Minns and Tierney, 2003) . In line with our theory, Minns and Tierney (2003) rising to 89 percent a decade later". Per capita income grew by almost 6 percent in the three decades after land reform and productivity growth accounted for about 2/3 of total growth. Between 1945 and 1972, the agricultural labor share fell from 2/3 to 1/3 (Oshima, 1986) . Consistent with our model, growth in manufacturing was driven by small enterprises. In 1961, 99.1 percent of manufacturing businesses had less than 100 employees. The average size was 8, increasing to 28 until 1971 (Mao and Schive, 1995) . 24 Many small enterprises were located in rural areas.
In Korea, during the 19th century a powerful class of landowners emerged and real wages (in terms of rice) were falling, only slightly rebounding in the first half of the 20th century. Due to the fear that tenants would shift towards communism, the U.S. military administration pressed towards land reform, which started 1950 (Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act). Similar to Taiwan, it enforced a cap on landholding of about 3 hectares. Moreover, farms had to be owner-managed or -cultivated. The government also bought land at low prices and sold it to tenants, who largely made payments in rice (Jeon and Kim, 2000) . 25 Compared to the colonial period, rice wages almost tripled until the end of the 1960s (Cha and Wu, 2002, Fig. 7) . Like Taiwan, South
Korea saw quick emergence of small manufacturing enterprises. This is remarkable as political and economic support mostly focussed on big firms in the 1950s. 26 The timing of the emergence of small businesses (despite suffering from the Korean war 1950-53)
is consistent with the effects of a land redistribution predicted by our model.
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Concluding Remarks
While land and other natural resources are key factors in primary goods production, development and structural change are driven by capital investments into manufacturing firms. The level of such investments depends on the number of individuals who have both an economic interest in and the economic means for entrepreneurial activities. In 24 In the 1950s growth was particularly fast in food-processing and textile industries. Later, industries in electronics and metal products evolved. 25 Half of the land was already sold prior to 1950 in anticipation of land reform. Landowners were basically forced to these transactions due to personal security threats after the end of Japanese rule. This was also the reason for the weak resistance of owners to land reform. 26 These were mostly former Japanese large scale industrial facilities established before 1940. The 115 biggest firms produced 33 % of manufacturing output in 1958 (Regnier, 1993, Tab. III) . Later on, government support shifted more and more to smaller firms as their important role was increasingly recognized. 27 The salient role of small businesses in early stages of development is well documented also for today's transition countries. In their survey, McMillan and Woodruff (2002, p. 166) stress: "New firms have usually been the fastest growing segment in transition economies". For instance, about one-sixth of industrial workers in Poland in 1994 were employed in start up firms. In Estonia, startups created almost all new jobs between 1989-94 and more than half of the new jobs in Bulgaria and Romania.
early stages of development, characterized by a substantial size of the primary sector, the means must be earned in the primary sector. How much of the income from primary goods production is left for entrepreneurial investment depends on the rents kept by landowners. These rents depend on the ownership concentration of landholdings and on the size of the labor force supplied to the primary sector.
Based on this line of reasoning, the model proposed in this paper suggests that an oligarchic land ownership may be a major obstacle to entrepreneurship and structural change. The key mechanism for this result is the interaction of oligopsony power of landowners in the rural labor market and imperfect credit markets. Higher concentration of landownership depresses wage income of potential entrepreneurs and therefore limits entrepreneurial investment into employment capacity. In general, however, there is also a counteracting effect. If higher ownership concentration in the primary sector sufficiently reduces wage costs of entrepreneurs, then more workers may choose to open up a firm under free entry, despite reduced employment creation per entrepreneur.
An adverse role of ownership concentration of landholdings for oligopsony power of landowners in the rural labor market is supported by evidence from Latin America, India, Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, the emergence of small manufacturing businesses in Taiwan and South Korea immediately in the aftermath of land reform suggests that a more equal land distribution plays an important role for promoting economic development apart from politically determined factors like the provision of education. An interesting task for future research may be to examine the role of the ownership structure in the gold-, oil-, uranium-, tin-or diamond-industry for the poor development of African countries within our framework. in the −sector. If total employment capacity installed by entrepreneurs is given by   , landowners face labor supply schedule
Suppose for simplicity that individual labor supply takes the isoelastic form   () =  1 ,   0, so that the inverse labor supply function in the −sector is given by   = (    )  . Observing this schedule, owners simultaneously choose labor demand (  )
to maximize profits   =  (  ) −     , taking the hiring of others as given. Then, since employers are identical, in Nash equilibrium we have   =     and the wage rate follows the standard oligopsony formula:
Thus, wages in the −sector are below their marginal product. Individual wage income in the −sector is given by
We first show that, in equilibrium,   is decreasing in both   and , which implies      0 and
From this, using   =    and  =   , we obtain    =     .
Hence, using   () =  1 and  =   , (26) can be rewritten as:
This implicitly defines the equilibrium wage rate in the primary sector,  (   ), as function of   and . Observing  00  0, we find      0 and
has the properties as claimed in (4). For later use, from (27) it is also easy to show
We next consider the profit of a landowner, given by   = (  ) −     . Using
, we can write equilibrium profit per owner as
Hence,
Substitute (27) into (31) to obtain Moreover, with   =  (   ), an owner's profit equals
where   =  (   ). Differentiation with respect to   yields:
where the envelope property has been used. In an analogous way, differentiation with respect to  yields: 
